

Europa, It's My Utopia?

The Theoretical Proposals and Conceptual
Implications of the Prospect of Turkish
Accession to the European Union

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INTRODUCTION

Turkey's orientation towards the institutions of the West dates from the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Since then, commitments to Westernisation and modernisation have been central themes of Turkey's state ideology.¹ Turkey has sought membership of all key Western international organisations, becoming a member of the Council of Europe and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952.² For many important sections of the Turkish political elite, accession to the EU has become a symbol for the successful completion of the long-term Ataturk revolution, involving the most basic and vital points of identity and orientation for Turkey.³ For scholars however, the prospect of Turkish accession presents the continuation of an ongoing debate between the theoretical schools of liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism.

The debate of rationality versus that of normative understanding is increasingly common through a wide range of international relations scholarship. Within the realm of EU enlargement⁴ this debate has been focused around what is more critical to EU preference formation, that is EU identity or economic and strategic considerations. The Turkish EU membership bid presents scholars and decision makers the prospect of some resolution upon this issue. This is because while Turkey offers member states potential economic expansion and security incentives, discourse of Turkish European Identity within the public arena has threatened to halt full accession. This diversion is represented within the wider theoretical debate. Liberal intergovernmentalist understandings propose that due to welfare maximising

¹ Bretheron, Charlotte, and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor*. pg. 141

² Desai, Seiju. "Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective - Risk or Opportunity?" pg. 371

³ Bretheron, Charlotte, and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor*. pg. 141

⁴ "Enlargement is the Process of gradual and formal institutionalisation of organisational rules and norms"- Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research. pg. 503

tendencies of actors, eventually Turkish accession will occur. On the other hand constructivism contends that due to the un-European nature of Turkey this can never occur.

The aim therefore is not to dwell upon whether or not the Turkish accession bid will be successful. Instead the objective is to fully make clear and demonstrate the finality that the decision upon Turkish accession will present to the theoretical debate between the schools. By employing the two contrasting frameworks to recreate preference formation understandings, two different positions become apparent which both cannot be correct. By establishing one debate to fall with or without Turkish membership, the result will demonstrate which consideration (identity or rational gain) holds prominence. The assumption of the EU in its entirety is due to the need for all states to agree upon the resulting course of action before Turkish accession will or won't occur.

Hence to achieve this 'Section I' will approach from the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, the economic and strategic implications of Turkish acceptance. From here, 'Section II' will move to a contrasting constructivist based approach assessing the notions of what it means to be considered 'European' and whether or not Turkey meets these criteria. Finally, 'Section III' will reiterate the results from the first two 'Sections' and present current alternative debates. This is due predominately to oppose the critique that interests and norm based arguments are not mutually exclusive, while also assessing the effect upon current scholarship and the finality that the final Turkish decision will entail.

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST APPROACH TO EU MACRO-POLITICS OF ENLARGEMENT

The member states enlargement politics within liberal intergovernmentalist scholarship is defined within the realms of rationalist thought. Concerned predominantly with welfare maximising actors creating international institutions in order to achieve absolute gains from

cooperation, Institutions becomes tools of the states.⁵ These tools allow states to pursue their interests more efficiently by reducing the transaction costs.

Welfare maximising argues that leaders of current EU members are promoting accession as they consider enlargement to be in their long-term economic and geopolitical interests. Therefore such welfare benefits are derived from three main sources: policy costs/benefits, transaction costs/benefits and domestic autonomy gains.⁶ Factors that determine the size of policy benefits relate mainly to a state's domestic structure and patterns of primarily economic interdependence. Moravcsik argues that the more important in terms of trade or investment a non-member state is for a member state, the more likely it is that this member state will support its access.⁷

Decisions on enlargement and the substantive context of enlargement bargains results from the unequal *bargaining power* of the incumbents. Moravcsik defines a state's bargaining power as 'inversely proportional to the relative value that it places on an agreement compared to the outcome of its best alternative policy.'⁸ Member states that expect net losses from enlargement will agree to enlargement if their bargaining power is sufficient to obtain full compensation through side-payments by the winners.⁹ This, in turn, requires that the necessary concession do not exceed the winners' gains from enlargement. Otherwise, the losers will consent to enlargement if the winners are able to threaten them credibly with exclusions, and if the losses of exclusion for the losers exceed the losses of enlargement. However due to the need for consensus over Turkish accession, for the sake of brevity the assumption is that a common position will be found through debate over rational based gains.

⁵ Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "The Study of EU Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings." pg. 101

⁶ Moravcsik, Andrew, and Milada Anna Vachudova. "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement." pg. 43

⁷ Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "The Study of EU Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings." pg. 104

⁸ Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Ppower from Messina to Maastricht.* pg. 62

⁹ Ibid.

IS THIS RELEVANT?

The primary point of reference one is presented when analysing the prospect Turkish accession through a liberal intergovernmentalist scope, is that of its economic consequences for member states. It is acknowledged that at least in the short run, enlarging to new members much poorer than the EU-15 inevitably burdens structural and agricultural funds consequently forcing existing member states to increase their contributions to the EU budget.¹⁰ On the other hand, enlargement is expected to lead to an extended market and thus to increased trade and economic gain. Economists pointed to both static and dynamic gains from integration, that is trade creation on the one hand, and economies of scale, enhanced competition and intensified research and development activity on the other.¹¹ The Commission in 2002 argued that enlargement would 'boost economic growth and create jobs in both old and new member states' and claimed that numerous analyses have shown that the benefits of enlargement outweigh the costs.¹² In line with these hypotheses, three of Turkey's characteristics initially imply potentially large demands on the EU budget: low level income, a large population and the importance of agriculture. However membership would grant in the long term large economic benefits.

As a lower middle income country with large concentrations of wealth, Turkey's poorest regions report income around one-fifth that of the richest regions. Turkish accession therefore would increase regional economic disparities in the enlarged EU by an estimated 9%, representing a major challenge for cohesion policy.¹³ European Commission proposals of the total structural and cohesion funds Turkey would be eligible for, reached €22.4 billion per year. With current expenditure within cohesion policy standing at €45.5 billion in 2007,¹⁴ member states reluctance to fast track Turkish accession becomes understandable. Furthermore as essentially

¹⁰ Moravcsik, Andrew, and Milada Anna Vachudova. "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement." pg. 44

¹¹ This point is discussed within: Baldwin, Richard E., Joseph F. Francois, Richard Portes, Dani Rodrik, and Istvan P. Szekely. "The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe."

¹² European Commission. *Question and Answers about the Fifth Enlargement* .

¹³ Jung, Stephanie, and Stanislav Kubaek. "Economic Aspects of Turkey's Accession to the EU: How Turkey's Membership is Challenging the EU." pg, 178

¹⁴ European Commission. "EU Budget 2007."

an agricultural country considerably less developed economically in comparison to the EU, Turkey would need considerable time to make a number of agricultural sectors more competitive in order to avoid substantial income losses for Turkish farmers. Under present Common Agricultural policies (CAP) Turkey would be eligible for substantial support. Estimating the total amount of support is difficult but one such forecast from the Commission places the amount at €8.2 billion per year.¹⁵ With the total expenditure upon CAP in 2007 budget being €42.7 billion,¹⁶ Turkish subsidies within CAP alone would equate to a total of 20% of CAP expenditure.

In order to comprehend the potential impact of such large demands upon other member states, the CAP and Cohesion Policies combined equate to just under 70% of the 2007 EU budget.¹⁷ Therefore the combination of the current estimates would mean that Turkey would be currently eligible for 24% of 2007 EU budget, a proposition that represents one of the current major concerns for European decision makers.¹⁸

Furthermore, the demographic size and the relative poverty of Turkey are factors giving rise to concerns about the likely immigration flows. With the entrance to EU removing all barriers to free movement of labour, Turkish labour flows if substantial and uncontrolled could lead to important disturbances within the EU labour market. Estimates place the total number of unskilled rural Turks expected to migrate by 2030 anywhere between 500,000 and 4.4 million.¹⁹ Yet if economic expansion advances sufficiently and rapidly while being accompanied by adequate employment policies and job creation, developing growth areas such as Istanbul and Koecali could absorb a large part of these rural migrant flows.²⁰

¹⁵ Commission of the European Communities. "Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession."

¹⁶ European Commission. "EU Budget 2007."

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ H.E.M. Legras, Michel, interview by Author.

¹⁹ Jung, Stephanie, and Stanislav Kubaek. "Economic Aspects of Turkey's Accession to the EU: How Turkey's Membership is Challenging the EU." pg, 182

²⁰ Ibid. pg. 183

The accession of Turkey to the EU therefore represents in the short term an important commitment by Europeans to substantial expenditure, even after a necessary reform of the EU budget and policies predicted. However the long term picture is much more promising. If Turkey accedes to the EU and gains greater international credibility, it will surely use EU funding, FDI and other investment flows to improve infrastructure and modernise industry. This also represents an enormous opportunity for European construction and engineering firms. Turkey has enormous mineral and raw material reserves and has strategic position in the crude oil transit network.²¹ These factors would be valuable additions to the European strategic resource position. Its cultural links and geographic position opens doors for Europeans into new markets, for example European firms based in Turkey supplying the wider Middle East area. Turkey's adhesion is therefore clearly in the interests of the European export, construction and engineering sectors. Moreover integration, as stated earlier, may bring economies of scale resulting from increased production due to the extension of the market. As well as the initial benefit to capital owner's profits and equity valuation, we might presume that households would also realise downstream benefits from the capital accumulation after sometime.

Therefore, in the short term the growth potential of Turkey's integration realistically is small. However, a study by Deutsche Bank Research Think Tank predicated an average growth rate of total GDP equating to 4.1% per year for the period 2006-20.²² This would mean that by 2020 the Turkish economy would be similar to today's Poland in terms of per capita income.²³ Furthermore with a large, young and growing population Turkey could potentially be a positive asset for a European economy burdened by the increasing weight on an aging population.²⁴

Security considerations are the second important contribution for liberal intergovernmentalist assessments. It is commonly understood that enlargement is expected to bring new capabilities and interests that augment the EU's ability to realise its security objectives. The 'EU Security

²¹ Ibid.

²² Deutsche Bank Research. "Turkey 2020: On Course for Convergence."

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

System' can be conceptualised as having two distinct roles. The first is the promotion of stability and security within its *immediate neighbourhood*. The second role is to act in a *wider* (global) security role.²⁵

Within the immediate region, Turkey has the potential to play a key function within many areas. Firstly the EU has recognised transnational crime and international terrorism, amongst others, as key threats to its internal security.²⁶ Turkey's position at the periphery of a prosperous region makes it a source, destination and transit route for transnational crime. Many third country nationals from the Middle East, Africa and Asia try to travel through Turkey in an attempt to reach Europe.²⁷ It is generally accepted that the principle supply of heroin into the EU region comes through Turkey and that the vast majority of opium/morphine that transits that country from the Golden Triangle²⁸ and Golden Crescent²⁹ is also processed into heroin there.³⁰ Turkey in the EU could act as the frontline against these ever-growing 'soft threats' through beneficial cooperation in the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar.

International Terrorism is not a new phenomenon for Turkey. For the past two decades, the country has been fighting Kurdish Terrorists. Whereas this conflict was ethnically fuelled, the 2003 bombings in Istanbul demonstrated that Turkey is not immune from Islamic terrorism. Although the AKP (the Turkish ruling party) has stressed that these were foreign planned and orchestrated attacks, the poverty and disillusionment in the east of Turkey provides a fertile ground for recruitment for groups such as Turkish Hezbollah.³¹ Concerns that these groups will be able to move freely across open borders into the heartland of Europe are fuelling the perception of Turkey as a security risk:

²⁵ Bretheron, Charlotte, and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor*. pg. 198

²⁶ Mitselgas, Valsamis, Jorg Monar, and Wyn Rees. *The European Union and Internal Security: Guardian of the People?* pg. 6

²⁷ Kirisci, Kemal. *Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration*. pg. 77

²⁸ Thailand, Laos, Myanmar

²⁹ Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran

³⁰ Roper, John. "The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests."

³¹ Ibid.

As far as the Islamic world is concerned – including the Islamic extremists, even Bin Laden – they're rejoicing over the entry of Turkey into the EU. This is their Trojan horse.

Muammar Gaddafi,³² Libyan Leader

It is highly unlikely that international terrorism will be defeated in the near-future, however Turkey's inclusion within the EU could create two effects. First, at a strategic level it would demonstrate that 'Christian Europe' is not the enemy of Islam. Second, Brussels could utilise Turkey's advanced military and intelligence capability in its struggle against this threat.³³ The EU has recognised that its own security is highly dependent on the stability and security of its near neighbourhood. It could be argued that Turkey being at the crossroads of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East and at the door of Central Asia, holds a strategic position which gives it a role of major importance.

As the EU increasingly seeks to take a greater responsibility in global matters, it does so with the framework of multilateralism and international law. While it is already an influential economic actor and development agent, for example in South America and South Africa, it now wants to reinforce these capabilities, if and when necessary with the ability to use force when its vital interests are at stake and to be able to respond more effectively to crises.³⁴ Turkey's participation in the EU's possible military operations could contribute significantly to their success and, maybe, could determine their feasibility.³⁵ Turkey's geographical location, NATO-class military infrastructure and logistical means constitute an indispensable environment for European military power projection to theatres of operation outside the EU. In short, Turkey could become a force multiplier in ESDP, especially when considering that the EU member states have armed forces that number 1.2 million, yet only 80,000 of these can be deployed

³² *The Times*. "Turn on the charm if you want to woo Europeans."

³³ Roper, John. "The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests."

³⁴ Desai, Seiju. "Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective - Risk or Opportunity?" pg. 379

³⁵ Everts, Steven. "The Ultimate Test: Can Europe and America Forge a Joint Strategy for the Wider Middle East." pg.671

overseas.³⁶ No less than 2.4 per cent of Turkey's gross domestic product is spent on the military and its capability will be further enhanced by a multi-billion dollar procurement programme.³⁷ Turkey also has the second largest army in NATO and thus already has a long experience of working with many European armed forces, sharing the same defence doctrines and training procedures. Turkey has also been involved in numerous UN missions, notably in Somalia, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrating its political willingness and ability to contribute to global security. Turkey's success as lead nation for operations in Afghanistan during 2002 was due in part to the Turks' cultural awareness and sensitivity for the Afghan people, based on long-standing relations.³⁸

Such cultural and religious values could become a significant asset especially in a world where Islam is the fastest growing religion. Turkey has been a member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference since 1960. The EU has acknowledged that, 'Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.'³⁹ Turkey could provide that vital link between the EU and the Muslim world.

Taking into account both the economic and strategic assessments of Turkish accession its potential becomes apparent. As a potential source of large economic growth and a strong partner within the Union's likely military plans, the liberal intergovernmental approach would argue the odds of *potential* succession are strong. Yet, when one observes the discourse that is occurring throughout the European Press and statistics of public opinion on the issue, a different story emerges altogether. According to a recent poll conducted by the European Commissions' 'Eurobarometer' of all the candidate and potential candidate countries, the prospect of Turkey's accession generated the most disapproval. 48% is opposed to its entry to

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Dannreuther, Roland. *European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*. pg. 162

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Torreblanca, Jose I. *Europe's Reasons and Accession*. pg. 6

the EU even if it complies with all conditions set by the EU; while 39% is in favour (see appendix 1).⁴⁰

Such sentiments are mimicked by various European political elites. According to Frits Bolkestein, the former Dutch European Commissioner, “Europe would implode,”⁴¹ due to Turkey’s geographical position in the midst of unstable regions and the potential influx of Islamic radicalism as threats to Europe. The French President Nicholas Sarkozy stated that “[he did] not believe that Turkey is a part of Europe, and for a simple reason that it is in Asia Minor.”⁴² German Chancellor Angela Merkel, although encouraging continued accession talks with Ankara, like Sarkozy, favours a privileged partnership agreement as opposed to full membership.⁴³

The question is therefore raised. If member state governments are able to gain significant economic and security advantages through a strategic partnership as opposed to membership, why would they offer such an agreement? It is here that constructivist understandings provide a important contribution.

CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO ENLARGEMENT

The constructivist perspective perceives institutions to have a fundamental impact upon the behaviour of actors. This is because such institutions shape actors’ underlying identities and interests. They provide meaning to the rights and obligations entailed within their social roles and therefore these actors conform to institutionally prescribed behaviour out of a normative commitment or habit.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Eurobarometer. “Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement.”

⁴¹ *The Times*. “European Union divided as Turks clamour to join.”

⁴² *Trend News Agency*. “Turkey should be EU partner, not member: French president.”

⁴³ Boland, Vincent. “Merkel softens stance on Turkish bid to join EU.”

⁴⁴ Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “The Study of EU Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings.” pg. 102

The more an external state identifies with the international community that the EU represents and the more it shares the values and norms that define the purpose and the policies of the EU, the more the member states are willing to pursue horizontal institutionalisation with this state.⁴⁵ Constructivist approaches towards EU macro-politics of enlargement are thus about whether an applicant state is 'European', whether it subscribes to the integrationist project of an 'ever closer union', adheres to the liberal democratic political value foundations of the EU, or shares the norms underlying specific EU policies. Depending on the extent of domestic consensus on the applicant state's identity and policy norms, enlargement politics in applicant countries will be more or less controversial and the resulting preferences about accession will be more or less strong.⁴⁶

As constructivism assumes strong institutional and cultural effects at the systemic level, it would generally expect that member states have largely homogeneous enlargement preferences, and thus that there would be little conflict over enlargement. If we loosen this assumption, we begin to see more variation in the preference formation. While we would expect EU institutions, such as the Commission, to hold preferences strongly influenced by EU norms, member states governments may be subject to partly competing influences from national and international identities and cultural environments. Furthermore, the resonance of particular EU norms might vary across different groups of policymakers, depending on their functional and organisational positions.⁴⁷

IS THIS RELEVANT?

Many leaders have argued that Europe's identity would be lost if Turkey entered the EU. They are thus echoing earlier comments made by former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who once said that a Muslim country like Turkey does not belong in Europe. Also the former President of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing stated in an interview in *Le Monde* in 2002 that a future

⁴⁵ Ibid. pg. 105

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid. pg 107

inclusion of Turkey in the Union ‘would be the end of Europe’ since Turkey ‘is not a European country.’⁴⁸

What the constructivist approach contends is that for state to be considered European and therefore eligible for membership, it must uphold the core principles of the Union. Manners identifies five core values – peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights – and four subsidiary values, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance – as contributing to the Union’s identity.⁴⁹ Undoubtedly, such values feature frequently in documentation and in the rhetoric of EU representatives. An interesting identity construction, which refers to most of the values identified by Manners, can be found in the draft Constitutional Treaty.

*In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.*⁵⁰

The question that then becomes apparent is to what extent does Turkey share these values and norms, thereby identifying with the European Union and qualifying itself as European? By comparing levels of shared norms between the CEEC member states with Turkey prior to their accession date, one should be able to draw conclusions as to the basic level of political and civil liberties needed in order to qualify as ‘European.’

According to independent evaluations from the years preceding the Copenhagen decision, Romania was classified as less democratic than both Turkey and all other CEE states. This is

⁴⁸ *BBC News World Edition*. “Turkey Entry Would Destroy EU.”

⁴⁹ Manners, I. “Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?” pg. 240

⁵⁰ Constitutional Treaty (Title I, Article I-3) as quoted in Bretheron, Charlotte, and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor*.pg.43

	<i>Political Rights</i>	<i>Civil Liberties</i>	<i>Political Rights</i>	<i>Civil Liberties</i>	<i>Political Rights</i>	<i>Civil Liberties</i>
Hungary	2	2	2	2	2	2
Poland	2	2	2	2	2	2
Estonia	-	-	2	3	3	3
Latvia	-	-	2	3	3	3
Bulgaria	3	4	2	3	2	3
Turkey	2	1	2	1	2	1

evident from Table 1 which indicates the countries scores on two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties.

As demonstrated despite having similar civil liberties as Romania, Turkish political rights were at this time superior, equal to that of Hungary and Poland. Furthermore in the years following this assessment, the prospect of EU membership has prompted large scale reforms of civil liberties. Since 1999 and the election of AKP, the prospect of EU accession has prompted an unprecedented programme of institutional and legislative reform.⁵¹ Such transformation has involved more than thirty amendments to the Constitution with the most prominent being the abolishment of the death penalty and movements towards recognition of the Kurdish minority.⁵² Many of the Turkish issue areas; weak democratic structures, instability within and around its borders, large poor population and large agriculture base to name a few, will potentially be rectified with the prospect of EU accession and the continued adoption of the *acquis*.⁵³ Despite such wide ranging reforms however, critiques of ‘Un-Europeanism’ continued to be evident amongst the various political elite discourse.

Therefore it can be considered that Manners five core values are the result of a much deeper European identity which is the result of a historical formation. Turks are often assumed to be culturally different from Europeans.⁵⁴ Constructions of Turkey as different – as the non-

⁵¹ Ibid. 143

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Moravcsik, Andrew, and Milada Anna Vachudova. “National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement.” pg. 50

⁵⁴ Bretheron, Charlotte, and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor*.pg. 51

European barbarian at the gate - date back to at least the seventeenth century.⁵⁵ Through the use of a common culture and history political projects like the EU and its process of enlargement create a shared 'we-feeling.' Such a feeling can be used to give meaning to political life, legitimise policies and create support.⁵⁶ The relevance of such an approach is evident in the case of enlarging the Union to Eastern Europe, a process embedded in a narrative full of arbitrarily chosen historical references.

The Eastern enlargement was described in terms of Europe's 'other half' finally 'coming home.'⁵⁷ The disappearance of the iron curtain was considered a historic moment – a moment when Europe should become not only united, but 'reunited', as if, at some point in time a united Europe actually existed. The aim, it was claimed, was to overcome 'the divisions of Europe and restoring the unity of the continent whose people share a common heritage and culture.'⁵⁸

Cultural proximity was frequently emphasised with discussing the relations between the EU-15 and the CEECs. In documents and speeches from the early 1990s, the close ties between the EC and the CEECs were repeatedly stressed. The closeness was described as consisting of a common history, a common culture and common values: 'Europe as a whole has a common cultural heritage which has its roots as much in the East as in the West'.⁵⁹ The existing EU members and the ex-communist states were said to 'share the same past' and 'have the same roots'. In a speech on enlargement, Hans van den Broek referred not only to geography, but also to culture, traditions and history, when emphasising Romania: 'By its history, geography, traditions and culture, Romania is a profoundly European country, which has an important place in our common heritage'.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Sjurson, Helene, ed. *Questioning EU enlargement : Europe in Search of Identity*.pg. 134

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ European Parliament. "Report on the European Union." C3-0091/91.

⁵⁹ European Parliament. "Report of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media." A3-0072/95.

⁶⁰ van den Broek, Hans. "'On the Road to Enlargement' SPEECH/97/217."

Turkey's relationship at the time with the EU-15 was described within a different light. Turkey was called a 'partner of the first order for the European Union', and Turkey and the EU were said to be highly interdependent.⁶¹ But instead of defining Turkey as part of Europe, the country has usually been given the role of the bridge between Europe and Asia, as illustrated by Leon Brittan; 'In an increasingly interdependent world, Turkey draws increasing strength from its position as a bridge between developed and developing neighbours, a bridge between Asia and Europe, a bridge between the religions of Islam and Western Europe'.⁶² The mutual interdependence that is said to exist between the EU and Turkey refers to economic and strategic issues only.

In post-Helsinki documents from the Commission, Turkey is defined in a very similar manner as it was in the first half of the 1990s. Being a 'bridge between civilization's still seems to be the role designated for Turkey. Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that 'as a large Muslim country firmly embedded in the European Union, Turkey would play a significant role in Europe's relations with the Islamic World.' At a later occasion, Rhen further stated that:

*A Turkey where the rule of law is firmly rooted in its society and state will prove that, contrary to prejudices, European values can successfully coexist with a predominantly Muslim population. Such a Turkey will be a most valuable crossroads between civilisations.*⁶³

This distinction as historically un-Europe is reflected within a recent analysis of the various statistical oppositions within the public to Turkish accession. The findings argue that previous immigration during the late 1970's from Turkey to Austria and Germany, saw an influx of a Turkish minority population.⁶⁴ Its failure to significantly integrate into European society has reinforced and pronounced the differences between the two groups. Such a divide as been exacerbated within the post-9/11 environment, where Islamic communities are becoming

⁶¹ van den Broek, Hans. "The European Union and Turkey. SPEECH/93/68."

⁶² Sjurson, Helene, ed. *Questioning EU enlargement : Europe in Search of Identity*.pg. 136

⁶³ Rhen, Olli. "EU and Turkey: Ahead of Historic Accession. SPEECH/98/534."

⁶⁴ McLaren, Lauren M. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." pg. 260

increasingly identifiable. These groups have become targets of increased hostility since the 11th of September. A number of incidents of violent assault, verbal abuse and attacks on property were noted, some of which were very serious. Muslim women wearing the hijab were easily identifiable and widespread targets for verbal abuse, being spat upon, having their hijab torn from them and being physically assaulted. A number of prominent mosques around the the United Kingdom were similarly attacked, ranging from minor vandalism and graffiti to serious damage through arson and firebombs.⁶⁵

With such understandings featuring prominently within the various discourses of EU citizens and member states political elites, the need for complete consensus for the prospect of Turkish accession becomes difficult. By differentiation between self and other (the key to identity construction) the EU is able to use the Turkish characteristics in order to strengthen the sense of European unity. Therefore this emphasis on cultural incompatibility with Turkey reflects an exclusive understanding of EU identity. This due to the exclusive nature of historical European basis needed to be considered European enough by member states to become eligible for accession. If 'culture' worked in favour of Romania, it has worked against Turkey. If and when Turkey becomes a member it will most likely be for other reasons than because of cultural factors.

TURKEY, THE THEORETICAL CHALLENGE

When considering the alternative findings outlined above, two different pictures as to the prospects of Turkish accession are painted. Liberal Intergovernmentalism argues that *eventually* the Turkish state will have a strong case for accession but at this stage, due predominately to the economic costs involved, substantial reforms are still needed. The Constructivist approach on the other hand disputes this, stating that the fundamental differences in historical and religious shaping forces mean that the Turks will never be

⁶⁵ Allen, Christopher, and Jørgen S. Nielsen. *Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001*. pg. 23

considered 'European' enough to become full EU members. Such a premise is enhanced by a wide range of public statements from political elites alluding to this notion, while the EU's decision to open membership talks to the Turkish government augments the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. The dichotomy which is therefore presented is two completely contrasting views which obviously cannot both be correct. This conclusion demonstrates that both elements of identity and values are not mutually exclusive within any EU decision. The Turkish accession debates, however, the first time demonstrated that this division at such a large magnitude. To rectify this theoretical situation, recent debate is focused around which of the two elements holds prominence and consequently becomes the more important consideration.

The notion of 'The Community Trap' is one such approach.⁶⁶ Through the analysis of CEEC states accession bids to the EU, Schimmelfennig argued that although this group offered no serious economic and security incentives for enlargement, they were able to trap member states by relational deployment of identity based arguments, so called "rhetorical action".⁶⁷ This concept proposes that by hijacking the ideology of a pan-European identity and the common bonds they share, pro-accession member states were able to pursued opposed states. The prospect of Turkish accession offers the opposite to this scenario. Although Turkey offers large long-term economic and security incentives to the EU, it is those very notions of pan-European identity that aided CEEC states, which are obstructing Turkish prospects.

The process that describes 'the community trap' can therefore be redefined as a 'community valve.' As the lack of 'Europeanism' will disallow for Turkey's full membership, the act of initiating accession negotiations can be understood as tool of 'soft power' to achieve a greater goal. As the 'crossroads' between the Islamic world and that of the Western political systems, it is considered important by the EU that Turkey becomes a model for the peaceful coexistence of

⁶⁶ Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union."

⁶⁷ Ibid. pg. 62

democracy and the Islamic faith. The peace, stability and economic growth it is argued is in the interests of all. The EU's goal becomes to influence Turkey to adopt the norms that define a European state without allowing full accession, essentially through offering a Strategic Partnership. During membership negotiations Turkish reform defined by the *acquis* is done to bring it in line with EU standards. As such institutions which are defined by the EU, inherently have the core values defined by Manners instilled within them, member states are able to maximise rational gains by influencing Turkey to create a strong Islamic democracy without jeopardising public support for their own domestic leadership. Thus, while the practices of well-resourced, purposeful and self-interested actors contribute to the construction of shared understandings, they do so within a context shaped in part by, and therefore secondary to, the Union's identity claim.

Responding to the subjection of Liberal Intergovernmentalism to Constructivist critique, Moravcsik retorts by arguing that "[i]nterstate idealism seems never to be as powerfully professed as when it runs parallel to material self-interest."⁶⁸ He continues on to state that three particular points suffice.

Firstly the overall effect of enlargement is modest. Turkey itself would represent less than 5% of the current EU GDP and thus have relatively little impact; "Rhetorical idealism can flourish when the impact is marginal."⁶⁹ Secondly, distinct material benefits, however modest, add to the EU-15 economic capacity. Turkey will add to the internal market 70 million new consumers in a rapidly growing economy.⁷⁰ Furthermore he goes on to point to the security benefits of increased member states and the common misperception of the high costs normally associated with enlargement.⁷¹ However such an approach does not confront the critique of 'The Community Trap,' that liberal intergovernmentalism cannot explain the motives for offering full membership or even touch upon the prospects of a strategic partnership instead.

⁶⁸ Moravcsik, Andrew, and Milada Anna Vachudova. "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement." Pg. 50

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

However what is unique about the Turkish case is that it is the first time that whatever member states decide will be able to discount significantly the importance of one or the other theorems. This is predominately due to those divisive conclusions that the evidence suggests within the previous sections. Therefore, although constructivist based epistemology offers the most conclusive argument and critique of the other, through the acceptance or non-acceptance of Turkey, member states will demonstrate which is more fundamental, interests or identity.

CONCLUSION

The wide ranging debate surrounding the prospects of Turkish is offered around the prospects and effects of the Enlargement upon the member states and the EU. However for academics, the beginning of Turkish accession talks signalled the potential of ending the debate between the two major schools of thought within this field. Yet it remains important to maintain awareness that the notions of constructivism and welfare maximising behaviour are not mutually exclusive. What Turkish accession would demonstrate therefore, is which consideration would hold precedent over the other within the field EU enlargement.


One of the shortcomings of this work however is that it disregards formation processes amongst the member states. This was done firstly for the sake of brevity, but secondly as unanimity is needed for any enlargement decision. Furthermore, this piece ignores the alternative theoretical explanations of supranational institutionalism and realism in favour of the two most prominent theories as outlined above.

Therefore, despite the western orientation of Ankara and the significant economic and strategic incentives Turkey presents, the notions of Turkey as Europe's bridge may halt all progress in favour of a strategic partnership. The implications, whatever the outcome, will define a wide range of issues; from how the EU perceives its role within the international community, where its borders lie, to the very definition of the EU itself. For academics however it also has the possibility of demonstrating which is more important, identity or interests and therefore ending

the long-lasting debate. Europeans and scholars are asking in anticipation what will the EUtopia become? It is the Turkey and its application which holds one of the answers to these questions.

APPENDIX 1

*'Once Turkey Complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be... to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?'*⁷²



⁷² Eurobarometer. "Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement."

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